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Abstract 25	
Reinforcement learning theory powerfully characterises how we learn to 26	
benefit ourselves. In this theory, prediction errors – the difference between a 27	
predicted and actual outcome of a choice – drive learning. However, we do 28	
not operate in a social vacuum. To behave prosocially we must learn the 29	
consequences of our actions for other people. Empathy, the ability to 30	
vicariously experience and understand the affect of others, is hypothesised to 31	
be a critical facilitator of prosocial behaviours, but the link between empathy 32	
and prosocial behaviour is unclear. During functional magnetic resonance 33	
imaging (fMRI) participants chose between different stimuli that were 34	
probabilistically associated with rewards for themselves (self) another person 35	
(prosocial) or no-one (control). Using computational modelling we show that 36	
people can learn to obtain rewards for others, but do so more slowly than 37	
when learning to obtain rewards for themselves. fMRI revealed that activity in 38	
a posterior portion of the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex/basal forebrain 39	
(sgACC) drives learning only when we are acting in a prosocial context, and 40	
signals a “prosocial” prediction error conforming to classical principles of 41	
reinforcement learning theory. However, there is also substantial variability in 42	
the neural and behavioural efficiency of prosocial learning, which is predicted 43	
by trait empathy. More empathic people learn more quickly when benefitting 44	
others, and their sgACC response is the most selective for prosocial learning. 45	
We thus reveal a novel computational mechanism driving prosocial learning in 46	
humans. This framework could provide new insights into atypical prosocial 47	
behaviour in those with disorders of social cognition. 48	
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 49	
Significance statement 50	
 51	
Prosocial behaviours are essential for social bonding and cohesion, but the 52	
mechanisms that underpin these behaviours are still poorly understood. Using 53	
computational modeling and neuroimaging, we show that people can learn to 54	
benefit others and that this learning is underpinned by reinforcement learning 55	
signals in the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC). However, there is 56	
substantial individual variability in people’s ability for prosocial learning. More 57	
empathic people learn faster and have more selective responses in the sgACC 58	
when benefitting others. Our results thus reveal a novel computational mechanism 59	
driving prosocial learning in humans and why empathy and prosocial behavior may 60	
be linked. This new framework could help to explain reduced empathy and 61	
prosocial behavior in people with disorders of social cognition.  62	
 63	
\body 64	
Introduction 65	
 66	
Prosocial behaviours, namely social behaviours or actions intended to benefit 67	
others, are a fundamental but poorly understood aspect of social interaction 68	
(1). To behave prosocially, animals need to learn about the consequences 69	
that their actions can have for others. In reinforcement learning theory (RLT), 70	
prediction errors (PEs) — differences between expected and actual outcomes 71	
— drive learning (2). RLT provides a powerful framework for understanding 72	
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how animals learn to obtain rewards for themselves (3). However, the 73	
processes by which animals learn to make choices that benefit others are 74	
unknown. Here, we use RLT to characterise ‘prosocial learning’, combining 75	
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and detailed computational 76	
modeling of behavior.  77	
 78	
Studies using economic games, moral judgments or charity donation tasks 79	
have consistently reported activity in the ventral striatum, posterior regions of 80	
the subgenual cingulate cortex/basal forebrain (hereon in referred to as 81	
sgACC), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and dorsolateral prefrontal 82	
cortex (DLPFC) during prosocial behaviour (4–7). Each of these regions 83	
receives input from midbrain dopaminergic neurons (8) and these cortical 84	
regions all project to the ventral striatum (9–11). There is substantive 85	
evidence that dopamine neurons projecting to this circuit code PEs for 86	
rewards delivered to animals (and humans) themselves (3). 87	
 88	
The ventral striatum, sgACC, dACC and DLPFC are also implicated in 89	
processing information about rewards others will receive (12–16), PEs when 90	
interacting with others (13, 17–19) and prosocial behavior (e.g. 4–7 )for 91	
reviews. Therefore, information processing in these regions may conform to 92	
RLT principles during social interactions. However, no prior work has 93	
examined how we learn to make choices that benefit others, a fundamental 94	
aspect of behaving prosocially. Do any of these areas signal a unique 95	
“prosocial” PE specifically when learning to benefit another? Or, is learning 96	
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that benefits another individual encoded in regions that signal PEs regardless 97	
of the beneficiary? 98	
 99	
Although humans have a remarkable inclination to engage in prosocial 100	
behaviours there exist substantial individual differences (1, 20–22). Empathy, 101	
the capacity to vicariously experience and understand the affect of others 102	
(23–27), has been hypothesised to be a critical motivator of prosocial 103	
behaviours (25–28). Previous studies have consistently shown that empathy 104	
can modulate neural responses to viewing others’ pain (29) and viewing 105	
desirable outcomes (rewards) that will be delivered to others (15, 30). 106	
Moreover, whilst empathy can be broken down into separable components 107	
associated with different social behaviors and traits (23, 31, 32), studies have 108	
suggested that both cognitive and affective aspects of empathic processing 109	
may motivate prosocial behaviours (33). Despite this body of research, the 110	
mechanistic link between empathy and prosocial learning remains unknown. If 111	
empathy is indeed linked to prosocial behaviour we might predict that 112	
empathy and prosocial learning would be associated, with those higher in 113	
empathy learning more quickly to benefit others.  114	
 115	
Participants (N=31) performed a reinforcement-learning task during functional 116	
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). On each trial they were required to 117	
choose between one of two symbols. One symbol was associated with a high 118	
probability (75%) and one a low probability (25%) of a reward. These 119	
contingencies were not instructed but had to be learnt through trial and error. 120	
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Critically, participants performed this task for themselves (self), for another 121	
person (prosocial) or in a control condition with no beneficiary (no-one) (Fig. 122	
1a). The no-one condition was crucial to account for previous studies showing 123	
‘fictive reward’ or ‘fictive prediction error’ brain responses which occur when 124	
rewards are not delivered to ourselves in entirely non-social situations (34–125	
36). This condition also allowed us to test for regions that showed relative 126	
specificity for processing social information, that is, regions that did not 127	
respond to self or ‘non-self’ information (see also (37) for a recent discussion).  128	
 129	
Using an RLT framework we conducted detailed computational modelling of 130	
trial-by-trial variation of behaviour, supported by Bayesian model comparison, 131	
to examine whether people were able to learn to benefit others at the same 132	
rate that they learned to benefit themselves. We examined whether activity in 133	
brain areas previously implicated in coding PEs for ourselves or in prosocial 134	
behaviour signalled PEs regardless of the beneficiary that received the 135	
outcome, or whether any of these regions exclusively reflected a “prosocial” 136	
PE when learning to benefit another (ventral striatum; sgACC (Brodmann 137	
Area (BA) 25/s24); dACC (BA24); and DLPFC (BA9/46d) – see Experimental 138	
Procedures). Moreover, we hypothesised that if empathy motivates prosocial 139	
behaviour then the rate at which people can learn to obtain rewards for 140	
others, and the neural signatures that underpin prosocial learning, should vary 141	
with trait levels of empathy.  142	
 143	
 144	
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 145	
Figure 1: Behavioural task and data. (a) Participants performed a 146	
reinforcement-learning task in which they had to learn the probability that 147	
abstract symbols were rewarded. At the beginning of each block participants 148	
were told whom they were playing for, either themselves, the other participant 149	
or in a condition where no-one received the outcome. (b) Group level learning 150	
curves showing choice behaviour in the three learning conditions. Trials are 151	
averaged over the three blocks (48 trials total per condition, 16 trials per 152	
block) for the self, prosocial and no one conditions. Dotted line shows chance 153	
level. (c) Comparison of learning rates (α) from the computational model. 154	
Participants had a significantly higher learning rate when learning in the self 155	
compared to the prosocial and no-one conditions. (d) Individual differences in 156	
empathy (online simulation) modulated the prosocial vs. self learning rate 157	
difference, with those higher in empathy having a more similar learning rate 158	
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between the prosocial and self conditions. (e) Participants were less 159	
consistent (higher β) when choosing for no-one compared choosing in the self 160	
and prosocial conditions. Asterisks represent significant differences (p<.05). 161	
 162	
Results 163	
 164	
Behavioural differences in learning to obtain rewards for self, another 165	
person or no-one  166	
 167	
Participants were able to learn to obtain rewards for themselves, the other 168	
person and no-one, performing significantly above chance in all conditions (all 169	
ts>9.1, all ps<.001, all dfs=30; Fig. 1b). Bayesian model comparison revealed 170	
that participants’ choices were best characterised by a model with separate 171	
learning rates and choice variability parameters in each condition (winning 172	
model evidence (ΔBIC)>600; see Online methods & Fig. S2. Comparing the 173	
learning rate parameters between conditions revealed a main effect of 174	
learning condition (F(2,60)=11.47, p<.001). Participants learnt more slowly if 175	
they were obtaining rewards for another person (prosocial) (d=.87, p<.001) or 176	
no-one (d=.53, p=.01) than if they were obtaining rewards for themselves (Fig. 177	
1c). There was no difference in learning rate between the prosocial and no-178	
one conditions (d=.25, p=.18). Choice variability (main effect of condition: 179	
F(2,60)=7.87, p<.001) could not explain these results, as participants had 180	
similar consistency scores when choosing for themselves and the other 181	
person (d=.24, p=.20), but were more random when choosing for no-one 182	
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compared to themselves (d=.46, p=.017) and the other person (d=.58, 183	
p=.003) (Fig. 1e). Together, these findings suggest that people have a ‘self-184	
bias’ in their learning, learning more quickly about rewards for themselves 185	
compared to for another person or no-one. However, people are similarly 186	
variable when choosing for themselves and others, and most variable when 187	
no beneficiary will receive the reward.  188	
 189	
Identifying common and distinct coding of prosocial prediction errors 190	
using functional imaging 191	
 192	
Using concurrently collected fMRI data, we next examined activity 193	
corresponding to the magnitude of PEs, time-locked to choice outcome and 194	
modelled independently of choice-related activity (see Experimental 195	
procedures). To identify common coding of self, prosocial and no-one PEs we 196	
first used a stringent conjunction-null analysis (38) (for main effects see 197	
Tables S1&2). Only responses bilaterally in ventral striatum, a region 198	
consistently shown to encode rewards delivered to self and others (39, 40), 199	
covaried with PEs in all three conditions (MNI coordinates [x=10, y=15, z=-9], 200	
Z=4.09, k=91, p=.006 voxel-level small-volume family-wise error corrected 201	
(SVC-FWE); and [x=-12, y=10, z=-11], Z=3.72, k=78, p=.023 SVC-FWE; Fig. 202	
2a-c). Responses in each learning condition were significantly greater than 0 203	
(all Z>3.72, p<.05 SVC-FWE; Fig.3). The ventral striatum therefore signalled 204	
PEs regardless of the beneficiary. 205	
 206	
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 207	
Figure 2: fMRI data, common coding of prediction errors. (a) Ventral 208	
striatum responses to PEs regardless of the agent the outcome was received 209	
by. (b) Overlay of ventral striatum response. All images displayed at p<.001 210	
uncorrected. Peak voxels all survive p<.05 FWE-SVC (see Fig. S2).  211	
 212	
We then identified regions that responded to prosocial PEs exclusively by 213	
contrasting the prosocial condition against the combined self and no-one 214	
conditions. The sgACC was the only region to specifically respond to 215	
prosocial PEs ([x=-2, y=4, z=-15], Z=3.83, k=148, p=.019 SVC-FWE; Fig. 3a-216	
c) and only parameter estimates for prosocial PEs were greater than 0 217	
(Z=4.95, p<.001, SVC-FWE). The sgACC therefore uniquely signalled PEs 218	
when learning to benefit another.  219	
 220	
 221	
 222	
 223	
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 225	
Figure 3: fMRI data, distinct coding of prosocial prediction errors. (a) 226	
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC) responses to PEs when learning 227	
to benefit another person. (b) Overlay of sgACC response (green) and VS 228	
response (yellow). Image displayed at p<.001 uncorrected and all peak voxels 229	
survive p<.05 FWE-SVC. Crucially the sgACC region in which activity 230	
covaried with prosocial PEs did not overlap with the vental striatum clusters. 231	
(c) sgACC response was modulated by individual differences in empathy 232	
(online simulation). 233	
 234	
 235	
 236	
 237	
We also tested for regions that showed greater responses to self/no-one than 238	
prosocial PEs. Both left ([x=-36, y=18, z=43], Z=4.47, k=62, p=.006 SVC-239	
FWE) and right ([x=32, y=15, z=39], Z=4.36, k=27, p<.020 SVC-FWE) DLPFC 240	
showed this pattern. We did not observe significant responses in the dACC for 241	
any contrast. 242	
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 243	
Mechanistic links between empathy and prosocial learning 244	
 245	
Next we tested whether individuals higher in empathy learnt at a similar rate 246	
to obtain rewards for others compared to themselves and whether variability 247	
in empathy modulated neural responses to prosocial PEs. Consistent with our 248	
predictions, we found that the “online simulation” subscale of the 249	
Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (41), a validated and 250	
psychometrically rigorous measure of trait empathy that probes the tendency 251	
to imagine how other people will feel (see Supplemental Experimental 252	
Procedures) was positively associated with the learning rate for the prosocial 253	
condition, relative to the self (to control for individual differences in learning 254	
per se) condition (r=.44, p=.01, 95% CI = .18, .66 ; Fig. 1d & Table S4). We 255	
then tested whether the online simulation subscale also predicted neural 256	
responses to prosocial PEs. Online simulation was also positively associated 257	
with prosocial (compared to self) PE responses in the sgACC (r=.39, p=.03, 258	
95% CI = .13, .60; Fig. 3d), with those higher in online simulation showing 259	
greater sgACC specificity to prosocial relative to self PEs. Together these 260	
findings suggest behavioural and neural links between empathy and prosocial 261	
behaviour. 262	
 263	
Discussion 264	
Reinforcement learning theory (RLT) has provided important insights into how 265	
we learn about rewarding information for ourselves. Here we used the RLT 266	
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framework to characterise prosocial learning and its underlying computational 267	
and neural basis. We found that the ventral striatum commonly coded PEs in 268	
all conditions, responding to PEs for self, another person and no-one. In 269	
contrast, the sgACC coded PE signals specifically when learning to benefit 270	
another. We also observed substantial variability in prosocial learning with 271	
differences in both neural and behavioural responses predicted by trait 272	
empathy. 273	
 274	
Our findings advance theoretical accounts of the neural basis of social 275	
behaviour by finding evidence for both ‘common coding’ and ‘socially specific’ 276	
regions of the brain underpinning prosocial behaviour (4–7, 42). PE signals in 277	
the ventral striatum, which is extensively connected with the sgACC (9), were 278	
evident regardless of the context of learning. This finding cannot be easily 279	
accommodated within current theories of ventral striatum contributions to 280	
learning, which suggest that this region is engaged when learning to obtain 281	
beneficial outcomes for oneself (3). Moreover, this finding adds to and 282	
extends existing studies of the role of the ventral striatum in social behaviour.  283	
Consistent with previous research we find ventral striatum responses to 284	
rewards delivered to both self and other (39, 40). However, we also find that 285	
these signals are evident even when no-one receives a rewarding outcome. 286	
The ventral striatum may therefore be important for learning in many contexts 287	
even when a reward is not obtained or consumed by anyone. The profile of 288	
response in the VS differs from the sgACC, which shows specificity for 289	
signalling PEs when learning to benefit another. Thus while both regions may 290	
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play a role in driving prosocial behaviour, the function of ventral striatum may 291	
be more domain general than that of sgACC, which we speculate may 292	
compute a prediction error specifically for outcomes delivered to others.  293	
 294	
Intriguingly, the sgACC region we identified as responding exclusively to 295	
prosocial PEs overlapped with a septal-anterior hypothalamic area that is part 296	
of the basal forebrain (43). Recent studies of sgACC function have found 297	
signals in this region relevant for social cognition and behaviour including 298	
credit assignment (44), prosocial and moral behaviour (6, 16, 45, 46), the 299	
experience of positive affect (47), trust (48), social emotion (49) and vicarious 300	
reward (50, 51). Moreover, there is evidence that the sgACC may signal PEs 301	
for self-reward, but only when learning occurs at a specific level of abstraction 302	
beyond basic stimulus-response association (52). One possible explanation 303	
for this convergence is that similar abstract learning mechanisms may drive 304	
how we learn to benefit others, and that both are underpinned by RLT 305	
principles. Further studies could compare tasks that manipulate both the 306	
social and the hierarchical context of a learning environment to directly test 307	
the parallels between these types of learning. In addition, future research 308	
should aim to dissociate the functions of the heterogeneous cortical and 309	
subcortical structures of the sgACC complex, using high-resolution fMRI, in 310	
order to understand which of these sub-regions contribute to social cognition 311	
and prosocial learning. 312	
 313	
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We did not observe responses in anterior insula or dACC in any of our 314	
contrasts. This may seem surprising given that these regions have previously 315	
been implicated in empathy and/or social behaviour (15, 29, 37). Whilst it is 316	
difficult to interpret a null finding, as there can be a number of reasons that a 317	
particular neural response was not observed, we note that in this experiment 318	
participants were performing their task in a different “reference frame” (see 319	
53, 54 for recent discussions of the role of references fromes in studies of 320	
social cognition) as compared with other studies on empathy/vicarious 321	
processing. In our task participants were making choices for another person, 322	
not only observing events that happened to others. In other words, in our task 323	
decisions were made in a “self-action” reference frame. Studies that compare 324	
different reference frames in the same paradigm could help shed light on the 325	
functional roles of specific brain areas during empathy and prosocial behavior. 326	
 327	
An important aim of our study was to explain what might drive variability in 328	
prosocial learning (1, 20–22). We identify the first evidence of a mechanism 329	
linking variability in empathy to variability in prosocial behaviour, with highly 330	
empathic individuals having an increased learning rate, and stronger sgACC 331	
PE signals, for other people’s rewards. Many accounts of empathy have 332	
argued for a crucial role of empathy in the development of prosocial and moral 333	
behaviour and the inhibition of aggression (25, 27, 55–58). Our demonstration 334	
that empathy is associated with a higher rate of learning about actions that 335	
result in beneficial outcomes for other people as well as the neural drivers of 336	
prosocial learning suggests a computational link by which empathy could 337	
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influence the development of prosocial and moral behaviours. Enhanced 338	
signalling of PEs and faster learning when benefitting others also provides a 339	
potential explanation for previous reports of individuals higher in empathy 340	
being more motivated to behave in a prosocial manner compared to those 341	
lower in empathy (21). Moreover, our results support an emerging view that 342	
PE signals may be crucial for learning how to interact, and empathise, with 343	
others (59). Twin data indicate substantial heritability of prosociality across 344	
development (60, 61).  Longitudinal developmental investigations, particularly 345	
ones that are able to tease apart genetic and environmental contributions to 346	
brain function (e.g. twin studies), would be helpful in determining the degree to 347	
which the specificity of sgACC activity during prosocial learning reflects an 348	
endophenotype for prosocial behaviour. 349	
 350	
An influential theory within the literature on empathy is that we empathise with 351	
others by a process of (embodied) simulation (62). This view is largely driven 352	
by studies that show a degree of overlap in the neural responses to self and 353	
other pain, particularly in anterior insula and ACC/MCC (reviewed in(29)), and 354	
for pleasant touch (63). Other studies have also supported a simulationist 355	
view of empathy by exploiting the placebo analgesia effect, showing that 356	
placebo analgesia changes self pain as well as vicarious pain (64, 65). While 357	
these studies are consistent with a simulationist account, it remains possible 358	
that there exist additional processes that do not operate through self-other 359	
overlap that participate in the experience of empathy (15, 30). For example, 360	
studies have suggested that other neurocognitive processes, in addition to 361	
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simulation, may be important when processing vicarious information, 362	
particularly in the domain of positive affect (see (51) for a meta-analysis and 363	
(30) for review). In the present study we observed that PE responses in the 364	
sgACC were present only when learning to benefit another person, and not 365	
when learning to benefit oneself or for no-one (including the latter to control 366	
for “fictive” PE signals), suggesting that a “socially-specific” signal is important 367	
for prosocial learning in this context. We also observed that those who self-368	
report that they ‘simulate’ most readily also have the most specific signals 369	
related to prosocial learning in the sgACC. This points to the intriguing 370	
possibility that simulation at the level of self-report may not necessarily be 371	
encoded in brain areas that respond to both self and other during learning. It 372	
should be noted that given potential gender differences in empathy and 373	
prosocial behaviour (e.g. 66) our sample in this study was comprised only of 374	
males. Future studies would benefit from also examining prosocial learning in 375	
females. 376	
 377	
Prosocial behaviours are fundamental for promoting social bonds and 378	
cohesion (1, 55, 67), and are disrupted in a number of psychiatric and 379	
neurological disorders (23, 68–70). Using the framework of RLT to understand 380	
how we learn to make decisions that benefit other people could offer new 381	
insights into why these disorders are associated with atypical prosocial 382	
behaviour and empathy. Taken together, these findings reveal a novel 383	
computational link between prosocial learning and empathy in humans and 384	
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therefore pave the way to characterise atypical prosocial interactions in those 385	
with disorders of social cognition and behaviour.  386	
 387	
Experimental procedures 388	
Participants 389	
Thirty-four right-handed healthy males (age 19-32, M=22.7 SD=3.0) were 390	
recruited through university participant databases. Exclusion criteria included 391	
previous or current neurological or psychiatric disorder, non-normal or non-392	
corrected to normal vision, non-native English language and previous or 393	
current study of psychology. Three participants were excluded from the 394	
analysis (two due to performance at chance level (~50%) in all learning 395	
conditions and one due to neurological abnormalities evident on the MRI 396	
scan) leaving a final sample of 31. With 31 subjects we had 80% power to 397	
detect a ‘medium’ effect size of d=0.52 at alpha=0.05 (two-tailed), an effect 398	
size smaller than typically reported in this field, indicating sufficient power. All 399	
participants gave written informed consent and the study was approved by the 400	
University College London Research Ethics Committee. 401	
Experimental task  402	
We examined BOLD signals that scaled parametrically with the size of a PE at 403	
the time of an outcome delivered to self, another person (here a confederate – 404	
prosocial condition) or no-one. Participants performed a probabilistic 405	
reinforcement-learning task where they were required to learn the probability 406	
that each of two symbols would be rewarded. One symbol of each pair was 407	
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associated with a high probability (75%) and one with a low probability (25%) 408	
of reward. Participants performed this task in three different learning contexts; 409	
self, prosocial and no-one. Participants were instructed that when they were 410	
playing for themselves they would receive any money they won. Crucially, 411	
when they were playing for the confederate, that participant would receive the 412	
money. When they were playing for no-one the points they saw would not be 413	
converted into any additional payment, either for themselves or the other 414	
participant. Participants were informed that the other participant was not 415	
aware that they were performing a task where they could earn extra money 416	
and that any money they won would be given to the other participant 417	
anonymously (i.e. it would be placed in a sealed envelope and the two 418	
participants would leave the scanning centre at different times).  419	
 420	
‘Self’ blocks began with the instruction ‘Play for YOU’ and had the word ‘YOU’ 421	
written above all choice symbols and outcomes. Prosocial blocks had the 422	
name of the confederate participant written above them. No-one blocks had 423	
the word ‘NO ONE’ written above elements in a trial. This ensured that 424	
participants were explicitly aware whether the decisions they made resulted in 425	
outcomes for themselves, for the other participant or for no-one (for trial 426	
structure and order see Supplemental Experimental Procedures and Fig 1a). 427	
Participants practiced one block (16 trials) of the task in a separate session 428	
~7 days before the scanning session to familiarise them with the experimental 429	
task. During this practice they were instructed that the outcomes would not be 430	
converted into any payment. 431	
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 432	
Procedure 433	
 434	
Participants were paired with one of two age- and gender-matched 435	
confederates whom they believed were naïve participants and had never met 436	
prior to the experiment. The confederates were trained in acting as naïve 437	
participants during a pilot experiment. Participants attended two sessions. The 438	
first session was attended only by the experimental participant and involved 439	
practicing the experimental task and completing questionnaires. This was 440	
done due to scheduling considerations and so that participants could practice 441	
the learning task on their own without the confederate present. The second 442	
session (<7 days later) was attended by both the experimental participant and 443	
the confederate. The participant and confederate were taken together to the 444	
MRI centre and filled in consent forms together in the same room. The 445	
confederate was then led into a behavioural testing room and instructed to 446	
complete questionnaires, with the experimental participant within earshot this 447	
interaction to increase belief in the deception. The experimental participant 448	
was taken to the scanning room and reminded of the instructions for the task, 449	
with the confederate participant unable to overhear this interaction to ensure 450	
that the experimental participants’ choices remained anonymous. Participants 451	
were told that they would view a pair of symbols on each trial and that they 452	
should select one of them. They would receive points for some of their 453	
choices that would be converted into money at the end of the experiment, 454	
such that the more points they received the more extra money they would 455	
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earn. They were instructed that the two symbols would not be the same in 456	
terms of how often they gave points and with some symbols they were more 457	
likely to win points than other symbols. Whether the symbols appeared on the 458	
left or right did not affect their meaning.  459	
 460	
Participants were instructed that they would receive extra payment based on 461	
the outcomes they received during the experimental task but in fact all 462	
participants were paid the same amount due to ethical restrictions (total £30, 463	
representing an additional £7 to the standard participant payment for the 464	
required time commitment). They also believed that the confederate 465	
participant could earn an extra payment based on the choices the 466	
experimental participant made during the task. A set of standardised 467	
questions completed after the scan confirmed that no participant had become 468	
suspicious about the deception during the experiment.  469	
Computational modelling of behavioural data 470	
Learning behaviour in the self, prosocial and no-one conditions was modelled 471	
using a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1998), which 472	
has been extensively used to examine the behavioural and neural basis of 473	
arbitrary visuomotor associations in both self and social contexts (13, 17–19). 474	
The RL model assumes that the associative value of an action (or stimulus) 475	
changes when new information reveals that the actual outcome of a decision 476	
is different from the expected outcome (2). Thus, on each trial ‘t’, an action ‘a’ 477	
has an expected associative value Qt(a) that is updated by the mismatch 478	
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between experienced and expected outcome on the current trial (the PE). At 479	
their most simple, RL algorithms state that expectations of future reward for 480	
action ‘a’, Qt+1(a) should be a function of current expectations Qt(a) and the 481	
discrepancy between the actual reward that has just been experienced on this 482	
trial ‘rt’ (coded as 1 or 0 for reward or no reward, respectively) and the 483	
expected reward for this trial ‘t’, Qt(a). The degree to which this discrepancy 484	
updates the expectation is scaled by the learning rate ‘α’ (bounded between 0 485	
and 1), such that: 486	
𝑄!!! 𝑎 = 𝑄! 𝑎 + 𝛼× 𝑟! − 𝑄! 𝑎!"#$%&'%() !""#"  
The learning rate ‘α’ controls the extent to which the current expected value is 487	
updated by new information. Consequently, a low learning rate will minimise 488	
the influence of the prediction error and the amount that the value is updated. 489	
The probability that a subject chooses action ‘a’ on trial ‘t’, given the expected 490	
values of the available actions Qt(a), is given by the softmax link-function:  491	
𝑝! 𝑎|𝑄! 𝑎 = 𝑒 !! ! !𝑒 !! !! !!!  
The temperature parameter ‘β’ controls the amount of exploration or noisiness 492	
for that participant (i.e. extent to which the subject decides to choose the most 493	
rewarding option vs. exploring potentially more rewarding actions). The 494	
softmax link-function estimates the trial-by-trial probability of each action by 495	
weighting the ratio of expected values by the temperature parameter. In this 496	
framework, a high temperature parameter ‘β’ would lead to similar action 497	
probabilities irrespective of the expected value of each action (resulting in 498	
random behaviour). A low ‘β’ would lead to consistent behaviour, where the 499	
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action with the higher expected value is invariably selected on each trial. In 500	
the full model, separate α and β parameters were estimated for each of the 501	
self, prosocial and no-one conditions, as this provided the most parsimonious 502	
explanation for the behavioural data (see supplemental experimental 503	
procedures for details of model fitting and model comparison, and Fig. S2). 504	
Statistical analysis of behavioural data 505	
Analyses of behavioural data were performed in SPSS 22 (Armonk, New 506	
York: IBM Corp). We examined differences between conditions in the learning 507	
rate and temperature parameters at the group level using separate repeated 508	
measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with three levels (self, prosocial 509	
and no-one). Separate ANOVAs were conducted as the learning rate and 510	
temperature parameters represent different units of measurement. We 511	
examined bivariate associations between the prosocial-self difference in 512	
learning rate and temperature and empathy questionnaire sub-scales using 513	
the Pearson correlation coefficient. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) were calculated 514	
by dividing the mean difference between conditions by the standard deviation 515	
of the difference(71). Confidence intervals for correlation coefficients were 516	
estimated using SPSS 22 Bootstrap procedure. 517	
Fmri acquisition and analysis 518	
A Siemens Avanto 1.5-T MRI scanner was used to acquire a 5.5-minute 3-519	
dimensional T1-weighted structural scan and 424 multislice T2*-weighted 520	
echo planar volumes with blood oxygenation-level–dependent (BOLD) 521	
contrast. The structural scan was acquired using a magnetization prepared 522	
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rapid gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence with 176 slices; slice thickness=1 523	
mm; gap between slices=0.5 mm; TR=2730 ms; TE=3.57 ms; field of 524	
view=256 mm x 256mm2; matrix size=256 x 256; voxel size=1×1×1 mm 525	
resolution. The functional imaging sequence was acquired in an ascending 526	
manner, at an oblique angle (≈30˚) to the AC-PC line to decrease the impact 527	
of susceptibility artefact in the orbitofrontal cortex (72) and had the following 528	
acquisition parameters: 424 volumes, 1 mm gap; echo time=50 ms; repetition 529	
time=2975 ms; flip angle=90°; field of view=192 mm; matrix size=64x64.  530	
 531	
Imaging data were analysed using SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Data 532	
preprocessing followed a standard sequence: the first 4 volumes and last 533	
volume were discarded. Images were then realigned and co-registered to the 534	
participant’s own anatomical image. The anatomical image was processed 535	
using a unified segmentation procedure combining segmentation, bias 536	
correction, and spatial normalization to the MNI template using the New 537	
Segment procedure (73); the same normalization parameters were then used 538	
to normalize the EPI images. The voxel size was resampled to 1.5 x 1.5 x 539	
1.5mm. Lastly, a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM was applied to spatially 540	
smooth the images. Before the study, example first-level design matrices 541	
were checked to ensure that estimable GLMs could be performed with 542	
independence between the parametric regressors (chosen value and PE in 543	
the three conditions), with correlations coefficients of r<0.25.  This allowed us 544	
to look at PE-related responses independent of chosen value.  545	
 546	
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Eight event-types were used to construct regressors in which event timings 547	
were convolved with SPM’s canonical haemodynamic response function. The 548	
three conditions at the time of the cues and three conditions at the time of the 549	
outcome were modelled as separate regressors using stick functions. Each of 550	
these regressors was associated with a parametric modulator taken from the 551	
computational model. At the time of the cue this was the chosen value, and at 552	
the time of the outcome, the PE (calculated as in Equation 1 above). The PEs 553	
were estimated using each subjects own alpha and beta from each condition. 554	
The instruction cue at the beginning of each block was also modelled in a 555	
single regressor as a stick function. In some participants, an eighth regressor 556	
modelled all missed trials, on which participants did not select one of the two 557	
symbols in the response window. For those participants where there was 558	
visible head motion in a particular scan (scans with >1 mm or 1 degree 559	
movement relative to the next were examined visually) an extra regressor was 560	
included corresponding to each scan. These images were removed and 561	
replaced with an image created by interpolating the two adjacent images in 562	
order to prevent distortion of the between-subjects mask (4 participants, less 563	
than 1% of total time series). Six head motion parameters modelled the 564	
residual effects of head motion as covariates of no interest. Data were high-565	
pass filtered at 128 s to remove low-frequency drifts, and the statistical model 566	
included an AR(1) autoregressive function to account for autocorrelations 567	
intrinsic to the fMRI time-series. Our primary analysis focused on the PEs at 568	
outcome (for response to chosen value see table S1). 569	
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Contrast images from the first level were input into a second-level flexible-570	
factorial design with three levels (self PE, prosocial PE, no-one PE). Main 571	
effects are reported at p<.05, family-wise error (FWE) corrected at the voxel 572	
level across the whole brain or p<.05 small volume corrected (SVC) at the 573	
voxel level in regions where we had a strong a priori hypothesis (see below).  574	
 575	
ROI selection and fMRI contrasts 576	
The a priori regions-of interest (ROIs) were defined anatomically using masks 577	
taken from an appropriate atlas (bilateral VS, sgACC, dACC, bilateral DLPFC; 578	
toolboxes: Harvard-Oxford Atlas, regions 46v and 9 (74), Anatomy Toolbox 579	
regions s24 and 25 (75), region 24 from (76), see Fig. S3 and supplemental 580	
experimental procedures for further details of ROI selection). We additionally 581	
applied a False Discovery Rate correction (FDR) (77), rather than Bonferroni 582	
correction (which may be overly conservative given that our ROIs were not 583	
entirely independent from one another as they are functionally and 584	
anatomically connected (9,10,11))), for the number of ROIs. All ROI 585	
comparisons remained significant (p<.05) when controlling for the number of 586	
comparisons using FDR.  587	
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